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INTRODUCTION
Lawrence A. Cunningham
Experienced readers of Warren Buffett’s letters to the shareholders
of Berkshire Hathaway Inc. have gained an enormously valuable
informal education.  The letters distill in plain words all the basic
principles of sound business practices.  On selecting managers and
investments, valuing businesses, and building corporate culture, the
writings are broad in scope, and long on wisdom.  By arranging
these writings as thematic essays, this collection presents a synthe-
sis of the overall business and investment philosophy intended for
dissemination to a wide general audience.
The central theme uniting Buffett’s lucid essays is that the
principles of fundamental business analysis, first formulated by his
teachers Ben Graham and David Dodd, should guide investment
practice.  Linked to that theme are management principles that de-
fine the proper role of corporate managers as the stewards of in-
vested capital, and the proper role of shareholders as the suppliers
and owners of capital.  Radiating from these main themes are prac-
tical and sensible lessons on the entire range of important business
issues, from acquisitions to governance to valuation.
Buffett has applied these traditional principles as chief execu-
tive officer of Berkshire Hathaway, a company with roots in a
group of textile operations begun in the early 1800s.  Buffett took
the helm of Berkshire in 1965, when its book value per share was
$19.46 and its intrinsic value per share far lower.  Today, its book
value per share exceeds $200,000 and its intrinsic value far higher.
The growth rate in book value per share during that period is about
19% compounded annually.
Berkshire is now a holding company engaged in 80 distinct
business lines.  Berkshire’s most important business is insurance,
carried on through various companies including its 100% owned
subsidiary, GEICO Corporation, among the largest auto insurers
in the United States, and General Re Corporation, one of the larg-
est reinsurers in the world.  In 2010, Berkshire acquired Burlington
Northern Santa Fe Railway Company, among the largest railroads
in North America, and has long owned and operated large energy
companies.
Some Berkshire subsidiaries are massive: ten would be in-
cluded in the Fortune 500 if they were stand-alone companies. Its
other interests are so vast that, as Buffett writes: “when you are
looking at Berkshire, you are looking across corporate America.”
3
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4 CUNNINGHAM
Examples: food, clothing, building materials, tools, equipment,
newspapers, books, transportation services and financial products.
Berkshire also owns large equity interests in major corporations—
including American Express, Coca-Cola, Moody’s, and Wells
Fargo.
Buffett and Berkshire Vice Chairman Charlie Munger built
this sprawling enterprise by investing in businesses with excellent
economic characteristics and run by outstanding managers.  While
they prefer negotiated acquisitions of 100% of such a business at a
fair price, they take a “double-barreled approach” of buying on the
open market less than 100% of some businesses when they can do
so at a pro-rata price well below what it would take to buy 100%.
Berkshire’s value can be approximated by first segmenting the
whole into five separate elements, which Buffett refers to as the
groves of Berkshire’s forest:
* some dozen insurance companies whose operations generate
abundant investable funds (low-cost liabilities called float), of late
running to $115 billion, which support the four asset groves;
* scores of operating subsidiaries, including a dozen of
America’s largest companies, most wholly owned, worth some $300
billion;
* a concentrated selection of common stock investments rep-
resenting sizable ownership percentages in major American com-
panies, worth nearly $200 billion;
* holdings in U.S. Treasuries and other cash equivalents, lately
exceeding $100 billion; and
* a handful of investment partnerships, such as Berkadia (with
Leucadia National) and partial ownership of Kraft Heinz, together
worth perhaps $15 billion.
Berkshire might be fairly valued by summing such asset groves
minus the insurance float (and less an estimate for deferred taxes
on the sale of assets). But an additional element of value arises
from housing the groves under one corporate canopy.  These in-
clude value from the low cost of funds, flexible capital allocation,
reduced corporate risk, miniscule overhead, tax efficiencies, and a
distinctive corporate culture.
According to Buffett, these results follow not from any master
plan but from focused investing—allocating capital by concentrat-
ing on businesses with outstanding economic characteristics and
run by first-rate managers.
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THE ESSAYS OF WARREN BUFFETT 5
Buffett views Berkshire as a partnership among him, Munger
and other shareholders, and virtually all his net worth is in Berk-
shire stock.  His economic goal is long-term—to maximize Berk-
shire’s per share intrinsic value by owning all or part of a
diversified group of businesses that generate cash and above-aver-
age returns.  In achieving this goal, Buffett foregoes expansion for
the sake of expansion and foregoes divestment of businesses so
long as they generate some cash and have good management.
Berkshire retains and reinvests earnings when doing so deliv-
ers at least proportional increases in per share market value over
time.  It uses debt sparingly and sells equity only when it receives
as much in value as it gives.  Buffett penetrates accounting conven-
tions, especially those that obscure real economic earnings.
These owner-related business principles, as Buffett calls them,
are the organizing themes of the accompanying essays.  As organ-
ized, the essays constitute an elegant and instructive manual on
management, investment, finance, and accounting.  Buffett’s basic
principles form the framework for a rich range of positions on the
wide variety of issues that exist in all aspects of business.  They go
far beyond mere abstract platitudes.  It is true that investors should
focus on fundamentals, be patient, and exercise good judgment
based on common sense.  In Buffett’s essays, these advisory tidbits
are anchored in the more concrete principles by which Buffett lives
and thrives.
GOVERNANCE
For Buffett, managers are stewards of shareholder capital.
The best managers think like owners in making business decisions.
They have shareholder interests at heart.  But even first-rate man-
agers will sometimes have interests that conflict with those of
shareholders.  How to ease those conflicts and to nurture manage-
rial stewardship have been constant objectives of Buffett’s long ca-
reer and a prominent theme of his essays.  The essays address some
of the most important governance problems.
The first is the importance of forthrightness and candor in
communications by managers to shareholders.  Buffett tells it like
it is, or at least as he sees it, and laments that he is in the minority.
Berkshire’s annual report is not glossy; Buffett prepares its con-
tents using words and numbers people of average intelligence can
understand; and all investors get the same information at the same
time.  Buffett and Berkshire avoid making predictions, a bad man-
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6 CUNNINGHAM
agerial habit that too often leads other managers to fudge their
financial reports.
Besides the owner-orientation reflected in Buffett’s disclosure
practice and the owner-related business principles summarized
above, the next management lesson is to dispense with formulas of
managerial structure.  Contrary to textbook rules on organizational
behavior, mapping an abstract chain of command on to a particular
business situation, according to Buffett, does little good.  What
matters is selecting people who are able, honest, and diligent.  Hav-
ing first-rate people on the team is more important than designing
hierarchies and clarifying who reports to whom about what and at
what times.
Special attention must be paid to selecting a chief executive
officer (CEO) because of three major differences Buffett identifies
between CEOs and other employees.  First, standards for measur-
ing a CEO’s performance are inadequate or easy to manipulate, so
a CEO’s performance is harder to measure than that of most work-
ers.  Second, no one is senior to the CEO, so no senior person’s
performance can be measured either.  Third, a board of directors
cannot serve that senior role since relations between CEOs and
boards are conventionally congenial.
Major reforms are often directed toward aligning management
and shareholder interests or enhancing board oversight of CEO
performance.  Stock options for management were touted as one
method; greater emphasis on board processes was another.  Sepa-
rating the identities and functions of the Chairman of the Board
and the CEO or appointment of standing audit, nominating and
compensation committees were also heralded as promising re-
forms.  Perhaps the most pervasive prescription is to populate
boards with independent directors.  None of these innovations has
solved governance problems, however, and some have exacerbated
them.
The best solution, Buffett instructs, is to take great care in
identifying CEOs who will perform capably regardless of weak
structural restraints.  In public companies, large institutional share-
holders must exercise their power to oust CEOs that do not mea-
sure up to the demands of corporate stewardship.  Outstanding
CEOs do not need a lot of coaching from owners, although they
can benefit from having a similarly outstanding board.  Directors
therefore must be chosen for their business savvy, their interest,
and their owner-orientation.  According to Buffett, one of the
greatest problems among boards in corporate America is that
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THE ESSAYS OF WARREN BUFFETT 7
members are selected for other reasons, such as adding diversity or
prominence to a board—or, famously, independence.
Most reforms are painted with a broad brush, without noting
the major differences among types of board situations that Buffett
identifies.  For example, director power is weakest in the case
where there is a controlling shareholder who is also the manager.
When disagreements arise between the directors and management,
there is little a director can do other than to object and, in serious
circumstances, resign.  Director power is strongest at the other ex-
treme, where there is a controlling shareholder who does not par-
ticipate in management.  The directors can take matters directly to
the controlling shareholder when disagreement arises.
The most common situation, however, is a corporation without
a controlling shareholder.  This is where management problems are
most acute, Buffett says.  It would be helpful if directors could sup-
ply necessary discipline, but board congeniality usually prevents
that.  To maximize board effectiveness in this situation, Buffett be-
lieves the board should be small in size and composed mostly of
outside directors.  The strongest weapon a director can wield in
these situations remains the threat to resign.
All these situations do share a common characteristic: the ter-
rible manager is a lot easier to confront or remove than the medio-
cre manager.  A chief problem in traditional governance structures
was that in corporate America evaluation of chief executive of-
ficers was never conducted in regular meetings in the absence of
that chief executive.  Holding regular meetings without the chief
executive to review his or her performance can produce a marked
improvement in corporate governance.
The CEOs at Berkshire’s various operating companies enjoy a
unique position in corporate America.  They are given a simple set
of commands: to run their business as if (1) they are its sole owner,
(2) it is the only asset they hold, and (3) they can never sell or
merge it for fifty years.  This enables Berkshire CEOs to manage
with a long-term horizon ahead of them, something alien to the
CEOs of public companies whose short-term oriented shareholders
obsess with meeting the latest quarterly earnings estimate.  Short-
term results matter, of course, but the Berkshire approach avoids
any pressure to achieve them at the expense of strengthening long-
term competitive advantages.
If only short-term results mattered, many managerial decisions
would be much easier, particularly those relating to businesses
whose economic characteristics have eroded.  Consider the time
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8 CUNNINGHAM
horizon trade-off Buffett faced in managing what he considers the
worst investment he ever made, buying Berkshire in the first place.
The economic characteristics of Berkshire’s old textile business had
begun to erode by the late 1970s.  Buffett had hoped to devise a
reversal of its misfortunes, noting how important Berkshire’s tex-
tile business was to its employees and local communities in New
England, and how able and understanding management and labor
had been in addressing the economic difficulties.  Buffett kept the
ailing plant alive through 1985, but a financial reversal could not be
achieved and Buffett eventually closed it.  This balancing of short-
term results with long-term prospects based on community trust is
not easy, but it is intelligent.  Kindred lessons carry over to other
sectors in which Berkshire invests, such as the newspaper business
in the internet age, and highly regulated industries, such as energy
and railroads, in which Buffett sees an implicit social compact be-
tween private enterprise and regulatory overseers.
Sometimes management interests conflict with shareholder in-
terests in subtle or easily disguised ways.  Take corporate philan-
thropy, for example.  At most major corporations, management
allocates a portion of corporate profit to charitable concerns.  The
charities are chosen by management, for reasons often unrelated
either to corporate interests or shareholder interests.  Most state
laws permit management to make these decisions, so long as aggre-
gate annual donations are reasonable in amount, usually not
greater than 10% of annual net profits.
Berkshire does things differently.  It makes no contributions at
the parent company level and allows its subsidiaries to follow phil-
anthropic policies they had in effect before Berkshire acquired
them.  For two decades, moreover, Berkshire used an imaginative
program through which its shareholders designated the charities to
which Berkshire would donate and in what amounts.  Nearly all
shareholders participated, donating tens of millions of dollars an-
nually to thousands of different charities.  Political controversy
over the abortion issue, however, interfered with this program.  Po-
litical activists organized boycotts of Berkshire’s products to pro-
test particular charitable donations that were made, destroying this
feature of Berkshire’s “partnership” approach.
The plan to align management and shareholder interests by
awarding executives stock options not only was oversold, but also
subtly disguised a deeper division between those interests that the
options created.  Many corporations pay their managers stock op-
tions whose value increases simply by retention of earnings, rather
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THE ESSAYS OF WARREN BUFFETT 9
than by superior deployment of capital.  As Buffett explains, how-
ever, simply by retaining and reinvesting earnings, managers can
report annual earnings increases without so much as lifting a finger
to improve real returns on capital.  Stock options thus often rob
shareholders of wealth and allocate the booty to executives.  More-
over, once granted, stock options are often irrevocable, uncondi-
tional, and benefit managers without regard to individual
performance.
It is possible to use stock options to instill a managerial culture
that encourages owner-like thinking, Buffett agrees.  But the align-
ment will not be perfect.  Shareholders are exposed to the down-
side risks of sub-optimal capital deployment in a way that an
option holder is not.  Buffett therefore cautions shareholders who
are reading proxy statements about approving option plans to be
aware of the asymmetry in this kind of alignment.  Many share-
holders rationally ignore proxy statements, but the abuse of stock
options should be on the front-burner of shareholders, particularly
institutional investors that periodically engage in promoting corpo-
rate governance improvements.
Buffett emphasizes that performance should be the basis for
executive pay decisions.  Executive performance should be mea-
sured by profitability, after profits are reduced by a charge for the
capital employed in the relevant business or earnings retained by it.
If stock options are used, they should be related to individual per-
formance, rather than corporate performance, and priced based on
business value.  Better yet, as at Berkshire, stock options should
simply not be part of an executive’s compensation.  After all, ex-
ceptional managers who earn cash bonuses based on the perform-
ance of their own business can simply buy stock if they want to; if
they do, they “truly walk in the shoes of owners,” Buffett says.
And owners’ interests are paramount on executive pay as with
other corporate governance topics Buffett addresses, such as risk
management, corporate compliance and financial reporting.
Corporate culture is among the most important yet least quan-
tifiable factors in assessing a business. At Berkshire, culture runs
deep. It begins with the tone at the top set at Omaha headquarters
by the norms and values that animate this collection. Berkshire’s
culture also permeates the subsidiaries that call Berkshire home
and the managers of the many and varied business units that com-
prise Berkshire today. Remarkably for a vast conglomerate com-
prised of a sprawling and diverse group of businesses, Berkshire’s
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10 CUNNINGHAM
culture is uniform and enduring and, Buffett says, will help Berk-
shire prosper long after he and Munger leave the scene.
INVESTING
The most revolutionary investing ideas of the past forty years
were those called modern finance theory.  This is an elaborate set
of ideas that boil down to one simple and misleading practical im-
plication: it is a waste of time to study individual investment oppor-
tunities in public securities.  According to this view, you will do
better by randomly selecting a group of stocks for a portfolio by
throwing darts at the stock tables than by thinking about whether
individual investment opportunities make sense.
One of modern finance theory’s main tenets is modern portfo-
lio theory.  It says that you can eliminate the peculiar risk of any
security by holding a diversified portfolio—that is, it formalizes the
folk slogan “don’t put all your eggs in one basket.”  The risk that is
left over is the only risk for which investors will be compensated,
the story goes.
This leftover risk can be measured by a simple mathematical
term—called beta—that shows how volatile the security is com-
pared to the market.  Beta measures this volatility risk well for se-
curities that trade on efficient markets, where information about
publicly traded securities is swiftly and accurately incorporated
into prices.  In the modern finance story, efficient markets rule.
Reverence for these ideas was not limited to ivory tower aca-
demics, in colleges, universities, business schools, and law schools,
but became standard dogma throughout financial America in the
past forty years, from Wall Street to Main Street.  Many profes-
sionals still believe that stock market prices always accurately re-
flect fundamental values, that the only risk that matters is the
volatility of prices, and that the best way to manage that risk is to
invest in a diversified group of stocks.
Being part of a distinguished line of investors stretching back
to Graham and Dodd which debunks standard dogma by logic and
experience, Buffett thinks most markets are not purely efficient
and that equating volatility with risk is a gross distortion.  Accord-
ingly, Buffett worried that a whole generation of MBAs and JDs,
under the influence of modern finance theory, was at risk of learn-
ing the wrong lessons and missing the important ones.
A particularly costly lesson of modern finance theory came
from the proliferation of portfolio insurance—a computerized
technique for readjusting a portfolio in declining markets.  The
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THE ESSAYS OF WARREN BUFFETT 11
promiscuous use of portfolio insurance helped precipitate the stock
market crash of October 1987, as well as the market break of Octo-
ber 1989.  It nevertheless had a silver lining: it shattered the mod-
ern finance story being told in business and law schools and
faithfully being followed by many on Wall Street.
Ensuing market volatility could not be explained by modern
finance theory, nor could mountainous other phenomena relating
to the behavior of small capitalization stocks, high dividend-yield
stocks, and stocks with low price-earnings ratios.  The piece de re-
sistance of market inefficiency was the technology and Internet
stock bubble that blew up in the late 1990s and early 2000s, marked
by stock price gyrations that spasmodically bounced between eu-
phoria and gloom without the remotest nexus to business value.
Growing numbers of skeptics emerged to say that beta does not
really measure the investment risk that matters, and that capital
markets are really not efficient enough to make beta meaningful
anyway.
In stirring up the discussion, people started noticing Buffett’s
record of successful investing and calling for a return to the Gra-
ham-Dodd approach to investing and business.  After all, for more
than forty years Buffett has generated average annual returns of
20% or better, which double the market average.  For more than
twenty years before that, Ben Graham’s Graham-Newman Corp.
had done the same thing.  As Buffett emphasizes, the stunning per-
formances at Graham-Newman and at Berkshire deserve respect:
the sample sizes were significant; they were conducted over an ex-
tensive time period, and were not skewed by a few fortunate exper-
iences; no data-mining was involved; and the performances were
longitudinal, not selected by hindsight.
Threatened by Buffett’s performance, stubborn devotees of
modern finance theory resorted to strange explanations for his suc-
cess.  Maybe he is just lucky—the monkey who typed out Hamlet—
or maybe he has inside access to information that other investors
do not.  In dismissing Buffett, modern finance enthusiasts still insist
that an investor’s best strategy is to diversify based on betas or dart
throwing, and constantly reconfigure one’s portfolio of
investments.
Buffett responds with a quip and some advice: the quip is that
devotees of his investment philosophy should probably endow
chaired professorships at colleges and universities to ensure the
perpetual teaching of efficient market dogma; the advice is to ig-
nore modern finance theory and other quasi-sophisticated views of




      08/20/2019   13:45:58
41581-cun_buf 5 edit Sheet No. 11 Side B      08/20/2019   13:45:58
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\c\cun\buf5th\cun101.txt unknown Seq: 22 20-AUG-19 13:38
12 CUNNINGHAM
the market and stick to investment knitting.  That can best be done
for many people through long-term investment in an index fund.
Or it can be done by conducting hard-headed analyses of busi-
nesses within an investor’s competence to evaluate.  In that kind of
thinking, the risk that matters is not beta or volatility, but the pos-
sibility of loss or injury from an investment.
Assessing that kind of investment risk requires thinking about
a company’s management, products, competitors, and debt levels.
The inquiry is whether after-tax returns on an investment are at
least equal to the purchasing power of the initial investment plus a
fair rate of return.  The primary relevant factors are the long-term
economic characteristics of a business, the quality and integrity of
its management, and future levels of taxation and inflation.  Maybe
these factors are vague, particularly compared with the seductive
precision of beta, but the point is that judgments about such mat-
ters cannot be avoided, except to an investor’s disadvantage.
Buffett points out the absurdity of beta by observing that “a
stock that has dropped very sharply compared to the market . . .
becomes ‘riskier’ at the lower price than it was at the higher
price”—that is how beta measures risk.  Equally unhelpful, beta
cannot distinguish the risk inherent in “a single-product toy com-
pany selling pet rocks or hula hoops from another toy company
whose sole product is Monopoly or Barbie.”  But ordinary inves-
tors can make those distinctions by thinking about consumer be-
havior and the way consumer products companies compete, and
can also figure out when a huge stock-price drop signals a buying
opportunity.
Contrary to modern finance theory, Buffett’s investment knit-
ting does not prescribe diversification.  It may even call for concen-
tration, if not of one’s portfolio, then at least of its owner’s mind.
As to concentration of the portfolio, Buffett reminds us that
Keynes, who was not only a brilliant economist but also an astute
investor, believed that an investor should put fairly large sums into
two or three businesses he knows something about and whose
management is trustworthy.  On that view, risk rises when invest-
ments and investment thinking are spread too thin.  A strategy of
financial and mental concentration may reduce risk by raising both
the intensity of an investor’s thinking about a business and the
comfort level he must have with its fundamental characteristics
before buying it.
The fashion of beta, according to Buffett, suffers from inatten-
tion to “a fundamental principle: It is better to be approximately
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THE ESSAYS OF WARREN BUFFETT 13
right than precisely wrong.”  Long-term investment success de-
pends not on studying betas and maintaining a diversified portfo-
lio, but on recognizing that as an investor, one is the owner of a
business.  Reconfiguring a portfolio by buying and selling stocks to
accommodate the desired beta-risk profile defeats long-term in-
vestment success.  Such “flitting from flower to flower” imposes
huge transaction costs in the forms of spreads, fees and commis-
sions, not to mention taxes.  Buffett jokes that calling someone
who trades actively in the market an investor “is like calling some-
one who repeatedly engages in one-night stands a romantic.”  In-
vestment knitting turns modern finance theory’s folk wisdom on its
head: instead of “don’t put all your eggs in one basket,” we get
Mark Twain’s advice from Pudd’nhead Wilson: “Put all your eggs
in one basket—and watch that basket.”
Buffett learned the art of investing from Ben Graham as a
graduate student at Columbia Business School in the 1950s and
later working at Graham-Newman.  In a number of classic works,
including The Intelligent Investor, Graham introduced some of the
most profound investment wisdom in history.  It rejects a prevalent
but mistaken mind-set that equates price with value.  On the con-
trary, Graham held that price is what you pay and value is what
you get.  These two things are rarely identical, but most people
rarely notice any difference.
One of Graham’s most profound contributions is a character
who lives on Wall Street, Mr. Market.  He is your hypothetical bus-
iness partner who is daily willing to buy your interest in a business
or sell you his at prevailing market prices.  Mr. Market is moody,
prone to manic swings from joy to despair.  Sometimes he offers
prices way higher than value; sometimes he offers prices way lower
than value.  The more manic-depressive he is, the greater the
spread between price and value, and therefore the greater the in-
vestment opportunities he offers.  Buffett reintroduces Mr. Market,
emphasizing how valuable Graham’s allegory of the overall market
is for disciplined investment knitting—even though Mr. Market
would be unrecognizable to modern finance theorists.
Another leading prudential legacy from Graham is his margin-
of-safety principle.  This principle holds that one should not make
an investment in a security unless there is a sufficient basis for be-
lieving that the price being paid is substantially lower than the
value being delivered.  Buffett follows the principle devotedly, not-
ing that Graham had said that if forced to distill the secret of sound
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14 CUNNINGHAM
investment into three words, they would be: margin of safety.
Over forty years after first reading that, Buffett still thinks those
are the right words.  While modern finance theory enthusiasts cite
market efficiency to deny there is a difference between price (what
you pay) and value (what you get), Buffett and Graham regard it
as all the difference in the world.
That difference also shows that the term “value investing” is a
redundancy.  All true investing must be based on an assessment of
the relationship between price and value.  Strategies that do not
employ this comparison of price and value do not amount to in-
vesting at all, but to speculation—the hope that price will rise,
rather than the conviction that the price being paid is lower than
the value being obtained.  Many professionals make another com-
mon mistake, Buffett notes, by distinguishing between “growth in-
vesting” and “value investing.”  Growth and value, Buffett says,
are not distinct.  They are integrally linked since growth must be
treated as a component of value.
Nor does the phrase “relational investing” resonate with Buf-
fett.  The term became popular in the mid-1990s, describing a style
of investing that is designed to reduce the costs of the separation of
shareholder ownership from managerial control by emphasizing
shareholder involvement and monitoring of management.  Many
people incorrectly identified Buffett and Berkshire as exemplars of
this descriptive label.  It is true that Buffett buys big blocks in a few
companies and sticks around a long time.  He also only invests in
businesses run by people he trusts.  But that is about as far as the
similarity goes.  If Buffett were pressed to use an adjective to de-
scribe his investment style, it would be something like “focused” or
“intelligent” investing.  Yet even these words ring redundant; the
unadorned term investor best describes Buffett.
Other misuses of terms include blurring the difference be-
tween speculation and arbitrage as methods of sound cash manage-
ment; the latter being very important for companies like Berkshire
that generate substantial excess cash.  Both speculation and arbi-
trage are ways to use excess cash rather than hold it in short-term
cash equivalents such as commercial paper.  Speculation describes
the use of cash to bet on lots of corporate events based on rumors
of unannounced coming transactions.  Arbitrage, traditionally un-
derstood to mean exploiting different prices for the same thing on
two different markets, for Buffett describes the use of cash to take
short-term positions in a few opportunities that have been publicly
announced.  It exploits different prices for the same thing at differ-
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ent times.  Deciding whether to employ cash this way requires eval-
uating four commonsense questions based on information rather
than rumor: the probability of the event occurring, the time the
funds will be tied up, the opportunity cost, and the downside if the
event does not occur.
The circle of competence principle is the third leg of the Gra-
ham/Buffett stool of intelligent investing, along with Mr. Market
and the margin of safety. This commonsense rule instructs inves-
tors to consider investments only concerning businesses they are
capable of understanding with a modicum of effort.  It is this com-
mitment to stick with what he knows that enables Buffett to avoid
the mistakes others repeatedly make, particularly those who feast
on the fantasies of fast riches promised by technological fads and
new era rhetoric that have recurrently infested speculative markets
over the centuries.
In all investment thinking, one must guard against what Buf-
fett calls the “institutional imperative.”  It is a pervasive force in
which institutional dynamics produce resistance to change, absorp-
tion of available corporate funds, and reflexive approval of sub-
optimal CEO strategies by subordinates.  Contrary to what is often
taught in business and law schools, this powerful force often inter-
feres with rational business decision-making.  The ultimate result
of the institutional imperative is a follow-the-pack mentality pro-
ducing industry imitators, rather than industry leaders—what Buf-
fett calls a lemming-like approach to business.
ALTERNATIVES
All these investment principles are animated in Buffett’s lively
essays concerning investment opportunities.  After explaining his
preference for investing in productive assets, and defining what this
means, a series of essays addresses a wide range of alternatives,
from junk and zero-coupon bonds to preferred stock.  Challenging
both Wall Street and the academy, Buffett again draws on Gra-
ham’s ideas to reject the “dagger thesis” advanced to defend junk
bonds.  The dagger thesis, using the metaphor of the intensified
care an automobile driver would take facing a dagger mounted on
the steering wheel, overemphasizes the disciplining effect that
enormous amounts of debt in a capital structure exerts on
management.
Buffett points to the large numbers of corporations that failed
in the early 1990s recession under crushing debt burdens to dispute
academic research showing that higher interest rates on junk bonds
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more than compensated for their higher default rates.  He attrib-
utes this error to a flawed assumption recognizable to any first-year
statistics student: that historical conditions prevalent during the
study period would be identical in the future.  They would not.
Wall Street tends to embrace ideas based on revenue-generat-
ing power, rather than on financial sense, a tendency that often
perverts good ideas to bad ones.  In a history of zero-coupon
bonds, for example, Buffett shows that they can enable a purchaser
to lock in a compound rate of return equal to a coupon rate that a
normal bond paying periodic interest would not provide.  Using
zero-coupons thus for a time enabled a borrower to borrow more
without need of additional free cash flow to pay the interest ex-
pense.  Problems arose, however, when zero-coupon bonds started
to be issued by weaker and weaker credits whose free cash flow
could not sustain increasing debt obligations.  Buffett laments, “as
happens in Wall Street all too often, what the wise do in the begin-
ning, fools do in the end.”
Many culprits contributed to the financial crisis of 2008,
among them the proliferation of derivative financial instruments,
which Buffett’s essays written several years earlier had warned
about.  Contemporary financial engineering has produced an ex-
plosion of complex instruments known as derivatives, because their
fluctuating value is derived from movements in a contractually des-
ignated benchmark.  Proponents believe that these devices are use-
ful to manage risk—and Berkshire from time to time takes modest
positions in derivatives contracts that Buffett judges as mis-priced.
But while proponents also believe that derivatives tend to reduce
overall systemic risk, Buffett presciently observed that they may
have the opposite effect.  They are hard to value, valuations can
change rapidly and they create linkages and interdependencies
among financial institutions.  Buffett cautioned that the combina-
tion of these factors could mean that, should a single event cause
challenges in one sector, that could spread rapidly to others with a
domino effect bringing devastating systemic consequences.  Such
was the case with the crisis of 2008.
Buffett acknowledges that his view on derivative risks may be
influenced by his aversion to any kind of mega-catastrophe risk
that would jeopardize Berkshire’s status as a fortress of financial
strength.  But this is no arm-chair opinion, for Buffett endured sev-
eral years of direct experience in managing a derivatives dealership
that came along with Berkshire’s acquisition of  the Gen Re rein-
surance company.  Buffett explains the unpleasant consequences of
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not dumping the business immediately but notes how it could not
be sold and contained a maze of long term liabilities that took sev-
eral painful years to unwind.  Buffett offers extensive meditation
on this experience so that others can learn from the Berkshire
trials.
Berkshire’s vast investment capital and Buffett’s network of
business confidants has led to several significant investment part-
nerships. Partners include Leucadia National in a partnership
called Berkadia as well the private equity firm 3G in a partnership
that bought Heinz and merged it with Kraft. Fascinating essays de-
scribe details and challenges of such partnerships, which illuminate
Buffett’s thinking on related negotiations and allocations of
responsibility.
COMMON STOCK
Buffett’s oeuvre dates to 1978—true, he’d written letters to his
partners earlier, but it was not until the 1980s that the letters came
to assume, in content and style, the rich quality for which they ulti-
mately became famous.  Specifically, since 1978, Buffett has always
written his letters with a specific purpose: to attract what he calls
quality shareholders—those who buy large stakes and stick around,
neither thoroughly-diversified indexers nor short-term traders.
Buffett stresses topics and practices that appeal to this cohort, em-
phasizing a long-term view and a focus on Berkshire’s distinctive
business fundamentals rather than its stock price.
Buffett recalls that on the day Berkshire listed on the New
York Stock Exchange in 1988, he told Jimmy Maguire, the special-
ist in Berkshire stock, “I will consider you an enormous success if
the next trade in this stock is about two years from now.”  While
Buffett jokes that Maguire “didn’t seem to get enthused about
that,” he emphasizes that his mind-set when he buys any stock is “if
we aren’t happy owning a piece of that business with the Exchange
closed, we’re not happy owning it with the Exchange open.”  While
Berkshire and Buffett are investors for the long haul, too many
others are temporary traders of common stock—whose actions
pose high costs.
A significant portion of corporate earnings are dissipated
through frictional costs associated with trading.  Trading is the rear-
rangement of who owns what shares.  The rearrangement entails
paying commissions to brokers, fees to investment managers and
cash to financial planners and business consultants who sell even
more advice during this process.  Of late, these frictional costs have
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escalated into whole industries that describe themselves variously
as hedge funds and private equity firms.  Buffett estimates that to-
tal costs may consume some 20% of the country’s total annual cor-
porate earnings.
While Buffett has always blasted the costs of trading, and since
the early 1990s recommended that ordinary investors favor index
funds to costlier fund investments, Buffett has above all en-
couraged Berkshire shareholders to load up and stick around, to
measure up to the concept of a quality shareholder, and has always
discouraged any interest from others. What’s more, he has never
talked Berkshire stock up and never encouraged anyone to buy the
stock.
Unlike many CEOs, who desire their company’s stock to trade
at the highest possible prices in the market, Buffett prefers Berk-
shire stock to trade at or around its intrinsic value—neither materi-
ally higher nor lower.  Such linkage means that business results
during one period will benefit the people who owned the company
during that period.  Maintaining the linkage requires a shareholder
group with a collective long-term, business-oriented investment
philosophy, rather than a short-term, market-oriented strategy.
Buffett notes Phil Fisher’s suggestion that a company is like a
restaurant, offering a menu that attracts people with particular
tastes.  Berkshire’s long-term menu emphasizes that the costs of
trading activity can impair long-term results.  Indeed, Buffett esti-
mates that the transaction costs of actively traded stocks—broker
commissions and market-maker spreads—often amount to 10% or
more of earnings.  Avoiding or minimizing such costs is necessary
for long-term investment success, and Berkshire’s listing on the
New York Stock Exchange helped contain those costs.
Stock splits are common action in corporate America that
Buffett points out disserve owner interests.  Stock splits have three
consequences: they increase transaction costs by promoting high
share turnover; they attract shareholders with short-term, market-
oriented views who unduly focus on stock market prices; and, as a
result of both of those effects, they lead to prices that depart mate-
rially from intrinsic business value.  With no offsetting benefits,
splitting Berkshire’s stock would be foolish.  Not only that, Buffett
adds, it would threaten to reverse five decades of hard work that
has attracted to Berkshire a shareholder group comprised of more
focused and long-term investors than probably any other major
public corporation.
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Share repurchases of underpriced stock can be a value-en-
hancing way to allocate capital, though these are not always what
they seem.  In the 1980s and early 1990s, share buy-backs were un-
common and Buffett credited managers who recognized that the
purchase of a share priced at $1 but with a value of $2 would rarely
be inferior to any other use of corporate funds.  Alas, as often hap-
pens, the imitators stepped in and now you frequently see compa-
nies paying $2 to buy back shares worth $1.  These value-
destroying share repurchases often are intended to prop up a sag-
ging share price or to offset the simultaneous issuing of stock under
stock options exercised at much lower prices.
Buffett lays out the rationale and terms under which Berkshire
occasionally embarks on share repurchase programs: when the
stock trades at a deep discount to intrinsic value. That makes the
investment an easy case, of clear value to continuing holders,
though Buffett has mixed feelings about repurchasing as Berk-
shire’s selling shareholders cash in at a discount. The solution: clear
disclosure to enable such selling holders to make an informed
decision.
Corporate dividend policy is a major capital allocation issue,
always of interest to investors but infrequently explained to them.
Buffett’s essays clarify this subject, emphasizing that “capital allo-
cation is crucial to business and investment management.”  Since
1998, Berkshire’s common stock has been priced in the market at
above $50,000 per share and the company’s book value, earnings,
and intrinsic value have steadily increased well in excess of average
annual rates.  Yet the company has never effected a stock split, and
has not paid a cash dividend in over three decades.
Apart from reflecting the long-term menu and minimization of
transaction costs, Berkshire’s dividend policy also reflects Buffett’s
conviction that a company’s earnings payout versus retention deci-
sion should be based on a single test: each dollar of earnings should
be retained if retention will increase market value by at least a like
amount; otherwise it should be paid out.  Earnings retention is jus-
tified only when “capital retained produces incremental earnings
equal to, or above, those generally available to investors.”
Like many of Buffett’s simple rules, this one is often ignored
by corporate managers, except of course when they make dividend
decisions for their subsidiaries.  Earnings are often retained for
non-owner reasons, such as expanding the corporate empire or fur-
nishing operational comfort for management.
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Things are so different at Berkshire, Buffett said at the sympo-
sium, that under his test Berkshire “might distribute more than
100% of the earnings,” to which Charlie Munger chimed in
“You’re damn right.”  That has not been necessary, however, for
throughout Buffett’s stewardship at Berkshire, opportunities for
superior returns on capital have been discovered, and exploited.
Wall Street engineers once tried to create securities that would
purport to mimic Berkshire’s performance and that would be sold
to people lacking an understanding of Berkshire, its business, and
its investment philosophy.
In response, Berkshire effected a recapitalization by creating a
new class of stock, called the Class B shares, and sold it to the
public. The Class B shares have 1,500th the rights of the existing
Class A shares, except with respect to voting rights they have 1/
10,000th of those of the A shares.  Accordingly, the Class B shares
should (and do) trade somewhere in the vicinity of 1/1,500th of the
market price of the Class A shares.
The Berkshire recapitalization halted the marketing of Berk-
shire clones that contradict all the basic principles Buffett believes
in.  These clones—investment trusts that would buy and sell Berk-
shire shares according to demand for units in the trust—would
have imposed costs on shareholders.  If held by people who do not
understand Berkshire’s business or philosophy, they would have
caused spikes in Berkshire’s stock price, exacerbating deviations
between price and value.
ACQUISITIONS
Berkshire’s acquisition policy is the double-barreled approach:
buying portions or all of businesses with excellent economic char-
acteristics and run by managers Buffett and Munger like, trust, and
admire.  Contrary to common practice, Buffett argues that in buy-
ing all of a business, there is rarely any reason to pay a premium.
The rare cases involve businesses with franchise characteris-
tics—those that can raise prices without impairing sales volume or
market share and only require incremental capital investment to
increase both.  Even ordinary managers can operate franchise busi-
nesses to generate high returns on capital.  The second category of
rare cases is where extraordinary managers exist who can achieve
the difficult feat of identifying underperforming businesses, and ap-
ply extraordinary talent to unlock hidden value.
These two categories are extremely limited, and certainly do
not explain the hundreds of high-premium takeovers that occur an-
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nually.  Buffett attributes high-premium takeovers outside those
unusual categories to three motives of buying-managers: the thrill
of an acquisition, the thrill of enhanced size, and excessive opti-
mism about synergies.
In paying for acquisitions, Berkshire issues stock only when it
receives as much in business value as it gives.  This has become
increasingly difficult for Berkshire to do.  This is the case because
Berkshire has assembled the business equivalent of the art collec-
tion at the Louvre.  Enhancing the value of the existing collection
by adding a single new Botticelli is difficult enough, and even more
so if you have to give up part of your Rembrandt collection to get
it.
It has also been difficult for managers of other companies to
follow this rule, but not so much because of the wonderful collec-
tion of businesses they have.  Instead, Buffett notes that sellers in
stock acquisitions measure the purchase price by the market price
of the buyer’s stock, not by its intrinsic value.  If a buyer’s stock is
trading at a price equal to, say, half its intrinsic value, then a buyer
who goes along with that measure gives twice as much in business
value as it is getting.  Its manager, usually rationalizing his or her
actions by arguments about synergies or size, is elevating thrill or
excessive optimism above shareholder interests.
Moreover, acquisitions paid for in stock are too often (almost
always) described as “buyer buys seller” or “buyer acquires seller.”
Buffett suggests clearer thinking would follow from saying “buyer
sells part of itself to acquire seller,” or something of the sort.  After
all, that is what is happening; and it would enable one to evaluate
what the buyer is giving up to make the acquisition.
Value-enhancing acquisitions are hard enough to find without
the added burden of higher average costs for all of them.  Indeed,
most acquisitions are value-decreasing, Buffett says.  Finding the
best value-enhancing transactions requires concentrating on oppor-
tunity costs, measured principally against the alternative of buying
small pieces of excellent businesses through stock market
purchases.  Such concentration is alien to the manager obsessed
with synergies and size, but a vital part of Berkshire’s double-bar-
reled investment approach.
Berkshire has additional advantages in acquisitions: a high
quality stock to pay with and a substantial amount of managerial
autonomy to offer once a deal is done—both rare in an acquiring
company, Buffett says.  Buffett also puts his money where his
mouth is, reminding prospective sellers that Berkshire has acquired




      08/20/2019   13:45:58
41581-cun_buf 5 edit Sheet No. 16 Side B      08/20/2019   13:45:58
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\c\cun\buf5th\cun101.txt unknown Seq: 32 20-AUG-19 13:38
22 CUNNINGHAM
many of its businesses from family or other closely-held groups,
and inviting them to check with every previous seller about Berk-
shire’s initial promises measured against its later actions.  In short,
Berkshire seeks to be the buyer of choice for attractive business
sellers—a lesson so important that it explains why Buffett prefers
to retain rather than sell even those acquired businesses that strug-
gle against business headwinds.
VALUATION
Buffett’s essays provide an entertaining and illuminating tuto-
rial on understanding and using financial information.  In dissect-
ing significant aspects of generally accepted accounting principles
(GAAP), Buffett shows both their importance and limits in under-
standing and valuing any business or investment.  Buffett demysti-
fies key topics that highlight the important differences between
accounting earnings and economic earnings, between accounting
goodwill and economic goodwill, and between accounting book
value and intrinsic value.  These are essential tools for any inves-
tor’s or manager’s valuation toolbox.
Aesop was to fables of the ancient world what Buffett is to
business essays in ours.  The essayist invokes the fabulist to show
that valuation has been the same across the millennia—Aesop said
“a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush” and Buffett extends
the principle to dollars.  Valuation is counting cash, not hopes or
dreams, a lesson many should have learned amid the late 1990s
tech rush bubble that burst when everyone finally realized there
were few birds in the bushes.  It is doubtful everyone learned the
lesson, however, for it has been taught repeatedly since Aesop’s
time and yet, well, it has been taught repeatedly since Aesop’s
time.
A leading example of Buffett’s specialized toolkit is intrinsic
value, “the discounted value of the cash that can be taken out of a
business during its remaining life.”  Though simple to state, calcu-
lating intrinsic value is neither easy nor objective.  It depends on
estimation of both future cash flows and interest rate movements.
But it is what ultimately matters about a business.  Book value, in
contrast, is easy to calculate, but of limited use.  So too with market
price, at least for most companies.  Differences between intrinsic
value and book value and market price may be hard to pin down.
They can go either way, but there will almost certainly be
differences.
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Buffett emphasizes that useful financial statements must en-
able a user to answer three basic questions about a business: ap-
proximately how much a company is worth, its likely ability to
meet its future obligations, and how good a job its managers are
doing in operating the business.  Buffett laments that GAAP con-
ventions make these determinations difficult, and indeed almost
any accounting system will be hard pressed to furnish completely
accurate answers given the complexities of business.  Acknowledg-
ing the monumental difficulty of inventing an accounting system
superior to GAAP, Buffett articulates a range of concepts that go a
longer way toward making financial information useful to investors
and managers.
Consider a concept Buffett calls “look-through earnings.”
GAAP investment accounting calls for using the consolidation
method for majority-owned equity, which means full reporting of
all line items from the investee’s financial statements on the par-
ent’s.  For equity investments from 20% to 50%, GAAP calls for
reporting the investor’s proportionate share of earnings of the in-
vestee on its statements; for investments of less than 20%, GAAP
provides that only dividends actually received by the investor be
recorded, rather than any share of the investee’s earnings.  These
accounting rules obscure a major factor in Berkshire’s economic
performance: the undistributed earnings of its investee companies
are an enormous part of Berkshire’s value, but would not be re-
ported on its financial statements prepared using GAAP.
Recognizing that it is not the size of an equity investment that
determines its value, but how the undistributed earnings are
deployed, Buffett develops the concept of look-through earnings to
gauge Berkshire’s economic performance.  Look-through earnings
add to Berkshire’s own net earnings the undistributed earnings in
investee companies, less an incremental amount for taxes.  Look-
through earnings are not different from GAAP earnings for many
businesses.  But they are for Berkshire and probably are for many
individual investors. Accordingly, individuals can adopt a similar
approach for their own portfolios and try to design a portfolio that
delivers the highest possible look-through earnings over the long
term.
The difference between accounting goodwill and economic
goodwill is well-known, but Buffett’s lucidity makes the subject re-
freshing.  Accounting goodwill is essentially the amount by which
the purchase price of a business exceeds the fair value of the assets
acquired (after deducting liabilities).  It is recorded as an asset on
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the balance sheet and then amortized as an annual expense, usually
over forty years.  So the accounting goodwill assigned to that busi-
ness decreases over time by the aggregate amount of that expense.
Economic goodwill is something else.  It is the combination of
intangible assets, like brand name recognition, that enable a busi-
ness to produce earnings on tangible assets, like plant and equip-
ment, in excess of average rates.  The amount of economic goodwill
is the capitalized value of that excess.  Economic goodwill tends to
increase over time, at least nominally in proportion to inflation for
mediocre businesses, and more than that for businesses with solid
economic or franchise characteristics.  Indeed, businesses with
more economic goodwill relative to tangible assets are hurt far less
by inflation than businesses with less of that.
These differences between accounting goodwill and economic
goodwill entail the following insights.  First, the best guide to the
value of a business’s economic goodwill is what it can earn on un-
leveraged net tangible assets, excluding charges for amortization of
goodwill.  Therefore when a business acquires other businesses,
and the acquisitions are reflected in an asset account called good-
will, analysis of that business should ignore the amortization
charges.  Second, since economic goodwill should be measured at
its full economic cost, i.e., before amortization, evaluation of a pos-
sible business acquisition should be conducted without regard to
those amortization charges as well.
Buffett emphasizes, however, that the same does not hold for
depreciation charges—these should not be ignored because they
are real economic costs.  He makes this point in explaining why
Berkshire always shows its shareholders the results of operations
with respect to acquired businesses net of any purchase price ad-
justments GAAP requires.
It is common on Wall Street to value businesses using a calcu-
lation of cash flows equal to (a) operating earnings plus (b) depre-
ciation expense and other non-cash charges.  Buffett regards that
calculation as incomplete.  After taking (a) operating earnings and
adding back (b) non-cash charges, Buffett argues that you must
then subtract something else: (c) required reinvestment in the busi-
ness.  Buffett defines (c) as “the average amount of capitalized ex-
penditures for plant and equipment, etc., that the business requires
to fully maintain its long-term competitive position and its unit vol-
ume.”  Buffett calls the result of (a) + (b) − (c) “owner earnings.”
When (b) and (c) differ, cash flow analysis and owner earnings
analysis differ too.  For most businesses, (c) usually exceeds (b), so
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cash flow analysis usually overstates economic reality.  In all cases
where (c) differs from (b), calculation of owner earnings enables
one to appraise performance more accurately than would analysis
of GAAP earnings, or cash flows affected by purchase price ac-
counting adjustments.  That is why Berkshire supplementally re-
ports owner earnings for its acquired businesses, rather than rely
solely on GAAP earnings figures, or cash flow figures.
ACCOUNTING
The ultimate point to understand about accounting is that it is
a form.  As a form, it can be manipulated.  Buffett shows just how
severe the manipulation can be with a satire written by Ben Gra-
ham in the 1930s.  The advanced bookkeeping methods Graham
presents enable his phantom US Steel to report “phenomenally en-
hanced” earnings without cash outlays or changes in operating con-
ditions or sales.  Except in its lampooning spirit, Graham’s
illustration of accounting chicanery is not all that different from
what is often seen coming out of corporate America.
GAAP has enough trouble.  Yet two groups of people make it
worse: those who try to overcome GAAP requirements by stretch-
ing their accounting imagination, and those who deliberately em-
ploy GAAP to facilitate financial fraud.  The former is especially
hard to deal with, as Buffett suggests in illustrating how debate on
accounting for stock options reveals the parochialism of many ex-
ecutives and accountants.  For example, criticizing the view against
treating stock options as expenses when granted, Buffett delivers
this laconic argument: “If options aren’t a form of compensation,
what are they?  If compensation isn’t an expense, what is?  And, if
expenses shouldn’t go into the calculation of earnings, where in the
world should they go?”  So far, he has gotten no answers.
The quest for integrity in financial reporting is endless, with
new flavors of accounting machinations developed regularly and
periodically sweeping the chief financial officer (CFO) suites of
corporate America.  The latest product to catch on is accounting
for “restructurings,” a label given to a whole range of maneuvers
that enable managers to engage in age-old earnings management
and smoothing techniques with greater felicity and deftness than
ever before.  Other examples concern estimates required when cal-
culating pension liabilities and the timing of sales of assets that
generate gains or losses to influence reported earnings.  Investors
beware.
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One clear lesson from Buffett’s discussions of financial infor-
mation is that accounting has inherent limits, even though it is ab-
solutely essential.  Despite enormous managerial leeway in
reporting earnings and potential abuse, financial information can
be of great use to investors.  Buffett uses it every day, and has allo-
cated billions of dollars doing it.  So it is possible to make impor-
tant investment decisions on the basis of available financial
information if one exercises knowledgeable judgment.  That judg-
ment may include making adjustments to determine look-through
earnings, owner earnings and intrinsic value.
TAXATION
Tax consequences drive decisions of many investors and busi-
ness managers. The approach can save costs and compound invest-
ment returns. For instance, under longstanding U.S. federal income
tax policy, gains on appreciated securities are not taxed until real-
ized by sale and are not indexed for inflation. In effect, this makes
the government a silent unpaid partner. During the holding period,
the investor accounts for the future obligations as “deferred taxes,”
a proxy for the government’s claim. At Berkshire, deferred taxes
have grown steadily, rising to around $60 billion. Buffett’s essays
on taxation make the subject come alive, aided by witty references
to venerable characters such as Rip Van Winkle and L’il Abner.
HISTORY
In addition to literary allusions, Buffett’s essays are sprinkled
with historical reference points, especially economic history. He re-
flects the importance of understanding the past to handle the pre-
sent and navigate the future. In a series of essays written from 2016
to 2018, Buffett canvasses U.S. economic history and assesses its
global value as extraordinary.  In a word, the message is
“tailwinds,” a nautical and aviation term denoting a strong positive
force propelling an object to its destination. It’s a fitting description
of the role U.S. political economy has played for nearly three cen-
turies for corporate America and its beneficiaries, including man-
agers, investors, and citizens alike.
CODA
When Berkshire under Buffett celebrated its 50th anniversary
in 2015, Buffett wrote a retrospective putting the company’s future
in historical context. Munger offered his parallel take. The two see
eye-to-eye on most subjects and Buffett invariably speaks for both
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in his essays (the phrase “Charlie and I” appears on 1/3 of the
pages in this book). But their styles differ greatly, as their respec-
tive accounts of Berkshire’s history and prospects in this collec-
tion’s concluding part attest.
Buffett’s coda exudes a cheerful disposition animating a dy-
namic reckoning of Berkshire’s accomplishments over five decades
and how what he calls “Berkshire culture” warrants optimism
about its future, calling the company “ideally positioned” for the
long-term future.  While concurring in substance, Munger’s dour
rendering stresses that the elements of what he calls the “Berkshire
system” were fixed early, helped it succeed, and assure that Berk-
shire will “remain a better-than-normal company for a very long
time.”
On the perennial topic of Berkshire beyond Buffett, the final
essay includes one of Buffett’s many jokes about his personal lon-
gevity: if enjoying life promotes longevity, he is jeopardizing Me-
thuselah’s record (969 years).  At the symposium featuring this
collection, someone asked what effect Buffett’s death would have
on Berkshire stock.  Another answered, “a negative effect.”  With-
out missing a beat, Buffett quipped: “It won’t be as negative for the
holders as it will be for me.”
